Michael Schaller’s The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–1945 offers a penetrating analysis of America’s deepening entanglement in Chinese affairs during the turbulent years surrounding World War II. Tracing the shift from cautious observation to full-fledged support for Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime, Schaller explores how U.S. policymakers came to view a strong, unified China as essential to countering Japanese aggression in Asia. This strategic vision led to not only overt military and economic aid, but also covert efforts—including plans to launch air attacks on Japan from Chinese soil and even schemes to replace Chiang with a more compliant leader. Yet behind this policy lay a fundamental misreading of China's internal dynamics, one shaped more by ideological hopes than by an accurate understanding of on-the-ground realities.

At the heart of Schaller’s narrative is the tension between Washington’s unwavering support for Chiang and the insights of the “China Hands”—a group of American diplomats and officials whose nuanced grasp of Chinese politics often clashed with official policy. As the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong gained strength, the U.S. continued to bet on the increasingly fragile Nationalist regime, hoping to mold China into a postwar democratic ally. Schaller argues that this "crusade" was based on an idealized and ultimately flawed vision, one that ignored critical signs of Nationalist weakness and dismissed the potential of alternative paths. The result, he contends, was a series of missteps that not only contributed to the failure of U.S. aims in China but also set the stage for prolonged American involvement in Asia’s Cold War struggles.

1979, Columbia University Press, 364p, ex-library, with usual stamps and markings, hardcover, with dust jacket.